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Abstract 
Whilst Information Systems research has focused 
on how products, processes, and organizations have 
to be transformed in the digital age, we know little 
about how and why the organizational culture of 
firms needs to be ‘digitalized’. Drawing on the or-
ganizational culture model by Edgar Schein, we ana-
lyze data from eleven cases across various industries 
to identify the facets of digitalizing firms’ organiza-
tional cultures. Specifically, we explore their Arti-
facts, Espoused Beliefs and Values, and Underlying 
Assumptions. Our study contributes by delineating a 
‘digital organizational culture’ that underpins the 
motivation for firms to digitalize.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
To successfully develop digital innovations, or-
ganizational culture is supposed to be a prerequisite 
[31, 35]. Digital innovation refers to products that 
combine digital and physical components [34]. We 
term firms that pursue the development of such digi-
tal innovations as ‘digitalizing firms’. For example, 
Tesla is a digitalizing firm as it has recently an-
nounced to equip every newly produced car (physical 
component) with self-driving hardware and software 
including ultrasonic sensors, cameras with 360-
degree visibility, and enhanced connectivity (digital 
components). The development of such digital inno-
vations is not possible without changing the basis of 
the organization [20] and its culture [32]. According-
ly, Boynton and Zmud [4] recommend that firms 
which undergo severe changes during digitalization 
[35] should consider the importance of their Organi-
zational Culture (OC) and its impact on IT. OC refers 
to common values shared by individuals within an 
organization [23]. OC originated from psychology 
but has been adopted in IS research to explain effects 
of culture on process management [11] or the impact 
of IT on work environments [29]. Researchers have 
investigated the role of OC on absorptive capacity 
and IT success [14], IT adoption and diffusion [7], IT 
implementation [13], and user computer efficacy 
[30]. Recently, OC has been discussed to be an ena-
bler for new knowledge and trigger for creativity 
[25], but also an obstacle regarding the adoption of 
new digital services [12].  
However, there is no dedicated work focusing on 
firms’ OC when developing digital innovations. 
Hence, our motivation for researching organizational 
culture is promising and also in accordance with 
Nambisan’s call that “the topic of innovation ecosys-
tems (particularly digital innovations) is one that has 
considerable contemporary significance” [20, p. 221]. 
OC may serve as a perspective on how we should 
think about organizing for digital innovation. Draw-
ing on the identified research gap, we formulate the 
following research question:  
What are the characteristics of an effective or-
ganizational culture in digitalizing firms? 
We conducted exploratory case studies with 27 
interviewees in eleven firms to understand their initi-
atives and managerial actions during digitalization. 
The next section introduces the theoretical lens of 
Schein which is then applied in our research ap-
proach explained in section 3. In section 4, we embed 
our results into the levels of the OC model. A discus-
sion of the main results is presented in section 5.  
 
2. Theoretical Foundation  
 
Schein defines organizational culture (OC) as “the 
deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are 
shared by members of an organization, that operate 
unconsciously, and that define in a basic ‘taken-for-
granted’ fashion an organization’s view of itself and 
the environment” [26, p. 6]. In other words, OC pro-
vides unwritten and unspoken rules for how to get 
along in the organization and conveys a sense of 
identity to employees [6]. To understand OC, Edgar 
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 Schein [27] distinguishes between different levels 
(i.e., Artifacts, Espoused Beliefs and Values, and 
Underlying Assumptions) of culture according to the 
degree to which the cultural phenomenon is visible to 
the observer (cf. Table 1, Column 1: “Levels”). In the 
following, these three levels are explained. 
 
2.1. Artifacts 
 
“Artifacts include the visible products of the 
group, such as the architecture of its physical envi-
ronment; its language; its technology and products; 
its artistic creations; its style, as embodied in cloth-
ing, manners of address, and emotional displays; its 
myths and stories told about the organization” [26, p. 
24] but also “structural elements such as charters, 
formal descriptions of how the organization works, 
and organization charts also fall into the artifact lev-
el” [26, p. 25]. Particularly observing the latter aspect 
allows recognizing an alteration of the structures 
within digital organizations. Edgar Schein [26, p. 42] 
exemplarily describes such artifacts in the following 
scenario: “The company was organized in terms of 
functional units and product lines, but there was a 
sense of perpetual reorganization and a search for a 
structure that would ‘work better’. Structure was 
viewed as something to tinker with until one got it 
right. There were many levels in the technical and 
managerial hierarchy, but I got the sense that the hi-
erarchy was just a convenience, not something to be 
taken very seriously.” 
In general, structural elements can be partitioned 
into two areas dealing with the direct reorganization 
of market activities (i.e. external structuring) and 
indirect reorganization of the divisions (also known 
as business units, i.e. internal structuring) within 
which they reside [16]. 
 
2.2. Espoused Beliefs and Values 
 
The second level of Edgar Schein’s model of OC 
defines Espoused Beliefs and Values as the embraced 
goals, ideals, norms, standards, and moral principles. 
An example of values is described by Schein [26, p. 
43] in the following situation: “Employees at all lev-
els were responsible for thinking about what they 
were doing and were enjoined at all times to ‘do the 
right thing’, which, in many instances, meant being 
insubordinate. If the boss asked you to do something 
that you considered wrong or stupid, you were sup-
posed to ‘push back’ and attempt to change the boss’s 
mind. If the boss insisted, and you still felt that it was 
not right, then you were supposed to not do it and 
take your chances on your own judgment.” Espoused 
Beliefs and Values are important because even the 
best-designed digital strategy may fail if the compa-
ny’s values do not embrace the transformation. For 
instance, barriers evolve when employees resist tran-
sition towards digitalized customer channels or agile 
development principles. 
Bughin et al. [5] revealed a strong positive link 
between values of a risk-taking culture and digital 
performance. Digital workers are inevitably con-
strained or empowered by the norms of the organiza-
tion’s values within which they work, particularly as 
it relates to IT governance and the affordances of the 
IT resources that they can access. 
 
2.3. Underlying Assumptions 
 
Third, Underlying Assumptions deal with occur-
rences that are inexplicable when insiders are asked 
to outline their OC [27]. At this level, information 
can only be indirectly collected through the observa-
tion of behavior and through triangulating data from 
multiple sources. The reason is that the third level 
consists of unconscious and taken-for-granted con-
ceptions and basic assumptions. These premises can 
be seen as the “starting point on which all values and 
actions are based” [11:3]. Yet, this oblivion impedes 
the understanding of certain Artifacts as well as Es-
poused Beliefs and Values to become manifest. 
Hence, to conclude why certain behavior occurs, one 
must identify the facets of the underlying assump-
tions and principles that establish an organization 
[24]. Apart from that, Schein argues that without un-
derstanding such assumptions it is not possible to 
interpret most of the behavior within a firm and “par-
ticularly the seeming incongruity between intense 
individualism and intense commitment to group work 
and consensus” [26, p. 46] remains unobserved. Fur-
ther, he illustrates the importance of assumptions 
being connected because single elements of a para-
digm cannot explain how an organization is able to 
function, or change, respectively. The following ex-
ample introduces such an Underlying Assumption 
[26, p. 56]: “’giving someone unsolicited information 
was like walking into their home uninvited’ came 
from a number of managers in subsequent interviews. 
It became clear that only if the information was asked 
for was it acceptable to offer ideas. One’s superior 
could provide information, though even that was 
done only cautiously but a peer would rarely do so, 
lest he unwittingly insults the recipient. To provide 
unsolicited information or ideas could be seen as a 
challenge to the information base the manager was 
using, and that might be regarded as an insult, imply-
ing that the person challenged had not thought deeply 
enough about his own problem or was not really on 
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 top of his own job.“ This illustrates how statements 
are recurrently evolving but require an interpretation. 
In the following section, we explain our research 
approach by stating how we integrated the results of 
our study into the levels of OC [26]. Specifically, we 
demonstrate how we structured the interviews’ and 
firms’ data into the three levels.  
 
3. Research Approach  
 
We collected data in eleven case studies, conduct-
ing 27 exploratory interviews, in order to understand 
how (Artifacts, and Espoused Beliefs and Values) and 
why (Underlying Assumptions) firms redesign their 
OC in times of digitalization (some of these firms are 
very successful and some face difficulties). Based on 
the recommendations of Eisenhardt [10] and Yin 
[33], the interviews followed semi-structured guide-
lines with open-ended questions to assure the exami-
nation of every possible research direction. We con-
tacted senior managers responsible for strategy, 
R&D, innovation, IT, or marketing/sales from a vari-
ety of firms and asked for participation if the compa-
ny publicly claimed initiatives regarding digitaliza-
tion. In most cases we collected data from three dif-
ferent senior managers who agreed to participate. The 
firms were not limited to any industry or size in order 
to embrace differences in several sectors. In the fol-
lowing, we provide an overview of the cases (due to 
the space limitations only a very brief overview is 
presented): 
 A (Gearings) is very innovative. However, they perceive 
digitalization to be a management fad. (Interview Partner 
IP1; firm size/employees: 2,000) 
 B (Online Bank) is a digital pioneer in developing digital 
innovations. (IP2-4; 1,500) 
 C (Press Outlet) seeks to digitalize its products but is 
impeded by the firm’s publishers’ resistance. (IP5-7;350) 
 D (Private Bank) stands out through integrating fintech 
companies. (IP8-10; 80) 
 E (Agriculture Technology) successfully digitalizes its 
business clients’ farms in co-creation. (IP11-13; 18,000) 
 F (Fund Services) is equipped with high financial re-
sources but prone to resisting management. (IP14; 3,000) 
 G (Retail Bank) is digitalizing through the creation of a 
new digital unit. (IP15; 100,000) 
 H (Construction Materials) has hired a digital native to 
digitalize the firm’s products and process. (IP16-19; 700) 
 I (Retail Bank) just appointed a chief digital officer for 
digitalizing from within. (IP20; 15,000) 
 J (Aviation)’s digital innovations are constrained by 
legislative circumstances. (IP21-23; 2,000) 
 K (Machinery) has a high volume in sales. Their digitali-
zation efforts are hindered by ‘monarchs’. (IP24-27; 
50,000) 
 
Interviews were conducted mostly onsite by two 
or three of the authors. The analysis of organizational 
efforts required us to create a trustful atmosphere by 
guaranteeing absolute privacy and to focus on the 
managers’ opinions. The interviews were conducted 
and recorded in German. The interview guideline was 
slightly updated during the interview cycle, to ac-
count for findings gathered from earlier interviews. 
The interviews took place from November 2015 to 
November 2016. All interviews were transcribed, and 
project documentation, related reports, financial 
statements, off-record notes, and observations were 
used to augment and triangulate the interview data.  
In the data analysis, we started with coding interpret 
the data and wrote narratives, and eventually revisit-
ed literature. Following Miles and Huberman’s [18] 
recommendations, this data analysis process was fa-
cilitated through the building of data displays in the 
form of tables and matrices (coding in MaxQDA 
v.12.2) to refine the concepts identified, and the de-
velopment of tentative conclusions to capture the 
identified facets. The data analysis began with open 
coding, as soon as the first interviews were tran-
scribed. It was done inductively, seeking to reflect 
the data as closely as possible. This stage led to the 
identification of over 1250 codings. Starting with the 
theoretical lens of OC, we identified the relevant 
concepts emerging from the data. Table 1 depicts 
these three levels (column 1) and the corresponding 
definitions according to Schein [26] (column 2), and 
our application of the three levels (column 3).  
 
Table 1. Levels of organizational culture 
Lev-
els 
Description Application to our results 
A
rt
if
a
ct
s 
Artifacts deal with organ-
izational attributes that 
can be observed, felt, and 
heard as an individual 
enters a new culture. 
In our study, Artifacts be-
come manifest in the chang-
ing structures of digitalizing 
firms. These are the facets 
explicated by practitioners 
regarding internal and exter-
nal structure of their firms. 
E
sp
o
u
se
d
  
B
el
ie
fs
 a
n
d
  
V
a
lu
es
 
This level deals with the 
espoused goals, ideals, 
norms, standards, and 
moral principles and is 
usually the level that can 
be captured through in-
terviews and question-
naires. 
For digitalizing firms, we 
derived ‘digital’ goals and 
norms which have been 
expressed as vital for a new 
OC. These values are con-
centrating around the men-
tality and authority modes 
towards digitalization.  
U
n
d
er
ly
in
g
  
A
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s 
This level deals with 
phenomena that remain 
unexplained when insid-
ers are asked about the 
values of the OC. Infor-
mation is gathered by 
observing behavior care-
fully to gather underlying 
assumptions because they 
are often taken for grant-
ed and not recognized.  
Firms operating in the digi-
tal age are driven by central 
tenets about digital innova-
tions that are recurrently 
addressed in stories and 
business reports within the 
cases. Abstracting these 
stories allowed us to derive 
four central assumptions. 
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 All codes of the data analysis were projected on 
the two levels Artifacts as well as Espoused Beliefs 
and Values of the concept of OC by identifying the 
relevant facets in the codings. Furthermore, we trian-
gulated all cases and abstracted the content of the 
interviews to derive the third level Underlying As-
sumptions. Last, we have evaluated whether all iden-
tified Artifacts, as well as Espoused Beliefs and Val-
ues, conform to the respective case studies, and 
whether they were exclusively reported in the context 
of digitalization efforts of the firms. The overall pro-
cess was highly iterative, moving between the levels 
and the codes as well as between data and theory. 
This approach allowed us to identify the facets of the 
three levels of OC that accompany the digitalization 
of firms regardless of the industry. Emergent foci 
have been identified as to the particular design of the 
questionnaire meaning that the identified findings in 
the different levels of Schein’s model predominantly 
revolve around the topics asked by following the re-
search guideline.  
 
4. Results 
 
In this section, we present the facets that we iden-
tified by taking the theoretical lens of Edgar Schein’s 
OC model (introduced in section 2) and applying it to 
digitalizing firms. We allocated the set of initiatives 
and managerial actions of the analyzed digitalizing 
firms to the corresponding levels of Schein’s model. 
 
4.1. Artifacts  
 
According to Schein [26], organizational struc-
tures fall under the definition of Artifacts. Hence, the 
altered structures we observed and analyzed due to 
digitalization in the cases match Schein’s understand-
ing of Artifacts. In our cases, OC in the digital age 
rests on novel ways of internal collaboration (namely: 
cross-functional teams, physical and virtual collabo-
ration, and dual structures) and external collaboration 
(startups, platforms with competitors and partners, 
and customer integration).  
First, in eight out of eleven cases we found evi-
dence that firms form cross-functional teams that 
are composed of different operational functions. This 
relatively high number of occurrences within our 
sample indicates that cross-functional teams are a 
popular best practice in digitalizing firms. Such 
teams are designed to reduce conflicts and possible 
confusion between the functions. Furthermore, a 
more integrated view of different functions is needed 
to ensure faster innovation cycles. Hence, the proce-
dure is characterized by mutual adjustment to the 
development of new products or processes. Thereby, 
collaboration concentrates on a horizontal basis, 
which puts people from IT, marketing etc. at one ta-
ble. As a result, cross-functional teams allow for 
“everyone to have transparency over everything” 
(IP15) and to form special teams for dedicated tasks 
with the needed input and know-how from different 
functions as the following quotation shows. 
Cross-functional teams are a form of collabora-
tion where “for every decision, no matter whether it 
is IT or marketing, everybody sits together. Market-
ing is not sitting by themselves and deciding about 
marketing, but we sit together in one big round […] 
ten to twelve people. All the decisions are discussed” 
(Chief Executive Officer of Case G, IP15). 
Next, in six cases collaboration broadens from 
physical to virtual collaboration. The importance of 
teamwork in the office without walls is almost equal-
ly important to teamwork happening virtually, i.e., 
independently from space and time. Physical collabo-
ration builds on a “restructuring of the office space 
with the elimination of isolated departments and the 
creation of space where everyone sits together” 
(IP02). Wide spaces without boundaries and demand-
ing people to mingle together are justified as 
knowledge is more easily shared within units than 
between them, even when activities within a unit are 
distant from each other.  
Physical and virtual collaboration are strongly 
needed, but managers feel “currently we do not have 
those ‘remote working’ people, who are delivering 
something from the home office or from Indonesia. 
This form of collaboration, working together with 
distant people, is currently a great challenge” 
(Product Group Manager of Case E, IP11). 
Third, we observed dual structures in six of the 
eleven cases, which build on the concept of ambidex-
trous organizations where breakthrough innovations 
must be balanced with evolutionary improvements of 
existing products or solutions. Here, the balance be-
tween digital innovations and development of the 
core business are needed to reach the combination of 
‘the best of two worlds’. Dual speed mechanisms 
separate the organizational structure into two parts 
with different foci. In our cases, the separation goes 
as far as two different locations where the predomi-
nant difference is speed. The traditional core func-
tions (part 1) still focus on traditional physical prod-
ucts less impacted by digitalization and, hence, re-
quire a lower speed of adaptation and change. These 
activities are operated with more traditional water-
fall-like development methods and a greater long-
term orientation. Contrary, the speed of innovation 
largely increases for business functions closer to the 
customer (part 2). Teams use agile product develop-
ment approaches to constantly incorporate changes. 
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 As a result, firms “operate at two speeds with the 
goal to reach again one speed in the future” (IP18).  
The dual structure is a new organizational struc-
ture where managers would “follow two strategies 
simultaneously. So, I can say, on the one hand, I also 
have here a clear development of the structure and 
parallel […] I would start a competition with an ac-
quisition that can do that already” (Head of Automa-
tion and Controls of Case E, IP12). 
Furthermore, the Artifacts of the OC do not only 
require new internal structures but also stronger ex-
ternal collaboration. We found in eight of our cases 
that through the collaboration with startups firms 
can profit from the dynamics in the market and gain 
knowledge that was not accessible previously. 
Startups can help the firms to accelerate their product 
innovation and can infect them with their entrepre-
neurial spirit. Hence, firms continue with their inte-
gration aspiration of external partners and use differ-
ent ownership models ranging from joint-venture to 
acquisition in order to improve collaboration [17]. 
Furthermore, firms extend their collaboration with 
financial investments in startups, which allows them 
“to secure strategic partnerships with a financial 
involvement” (IP18) and with the goal to “genuinely 
cooperate with Fintechs for many years” (IP14). Fur-
thermore, firms are offering new products and inno-
vations to startups for further development of the idea 
and increasing knowledge exchange.  
We observed collaboration with startups where 
“the focus clearly lies on finding fin tech companies, 
with whom we can cooperate, in the sense, that we 
can improve our business for the customer” (Chief 
Marketing Manager of Case H, IP18). 
Next to startups, in five out of eleven cases, we 
observe firms strengthening their external collabora-
tion efforts towards establishing platforms with 
partners and competitors. Platforms are perceived 
as an organizational structure, in the widest sense, to 
gather different partners in one central place and en-
hance the exchange between partners. These partners 
are then used to infuse the traditional products of 
firms with digital capabilities externally provided. 
Examples are firms producing traditional machinery 
partnering with IT partners for sensor technology 
(IP11). The partners allow the firms to compete with 
startups on an equal playing field which would not be 
the case without partners. The external collaboration 
goes as far as to include competitors, where firms try 
to partner for special applications or to increase mar-
ket boundaries. In the end, external collaboration 
often culminates in a platform where the different 
entities come together. Platforms are seen as a way 
for open exchange where firms can let their products 
be “tested and refined” (IP14). Furthermore, plat-
forms are used to ensure the sharing, transparency, 
and integrity of data via different partners. Collabora-
tion builds on external support from “[…] plat-
form[s], where we are participating as a partner with 
others. That is also driven in the interest of the cus-
tomers to establish a platform where firms are work-
ing together with others, like app developers, to pro-
duce various things” (Product Group Manager of 
Case E, IP11). 
Finally, in all cases, firms’ collaboration efforts 
do not longer exclude the customer. Specifically, in 
seven of our cases, the Artifacts of OC include ways 
to integrate customers into the innovation chain and 
external collaboration. Hence, those firms are aiming 
for ‘co-creation’ with their customers where custom-
ers and firms are developing products jointly (IP14). 
Hence, direct feedback loops are implemented and 
the organizational structure provides a lot of interac-
tion between employees and customers. The early in-
tegration of customers via customer product presen-
tations and beta-testers allows generating reference 
customers, which test and review new products for 
other customers. Reference customers are provided 
with more information from the core of the product 
development and can support the firms’ marketing 
better than if firms have to confer, “we have only 
tested it in the lab but it should work” (IP12). In the 
end, the collaboration with customers is the best to 
fully develop the product to the end and build final 
touches on feedback from integrated customers.  
Firms are extending their external collaboration to 
the customers “because we are clearly saying, ok, if 
we are looking at the tension between time and con-
tent, we don’t want to say, that the trend is necessari-
ly going towards ‘banana product’, which mainly 
ripe with the customer, but we see a shift of the ripen-
ing phase from internal to external” (Head of Auto-
mation and Controls of Case E, IP12). 
 
4.2. Espoused Beliefs and Values  
 
Espoused Beliefs and Values, as the second level 
of OC, cover soft factors which are hard to anchor in 
rules or specifications, but which have to be valued 
and lived by the employees [27]. Organizational be-
liefs and values are a vital component of an OC and 
can contribute to a firm’s sustainable competitive 
advantage [2].  
First, in eight out of eleven cases, we distilled a 
startup mentality, which is conceptualized as a very 
collaborative way of working with little to no formal-
ization, less hierarchy, higher adaptiveness to change, 
and strong customer focus [3]. In order to do so, the 
startup mentality builds on the ability to channel re-
sources to new projects and supports the generation 
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 of new ideas to solve customer problems. These ideas 
are submitted from all levels of the organization and 
the idea generation is integrated into the work tasks 
of everyone. This mentality is usually only found in 
startups since established firms have difficulties in 
incorporating values which are usually found in 
smaller, less mature firms like direct communication 
and greater openness.  
Creating a startup mentality is a novel approach to 
enable digitalization and the goal is “that this mind-
set is ideally with every employee. This is, as far as I 
know, important for the overall process – especially 
to the question: Where are the ideas coming from? 
How are we dealing with the idea? […] What is hap-
pening in the world? […] Each employee can submit 
improvements.” Chief Technical Officer of Case B 
(IP04). 
These values are closely connected to digital in-
novation and are believed to trigger new product de-
velopment. For instance, one practitioner explained 
that they are establishing a place with values “where 
colleagues can come up with something completely 
different” (IP03). This “bravery to try out new 
things” (IP04) is rooted in a startup mentality which 
connotes the concept of intrapreneurship [1].  
In seven of the cases, we identified the conse-
quent further development to a culture where fail-
ures are accepted. The so-called ‘failure culture’ 
motivates employees to take risks and try out new 
things even if negative effects might be the result. 
Employees are encouraged to build prototypes which 
focus primarily on the direct customer experience 
without engineering the product until the end (IP03) 
and possibly risking to over-engineer the product.  
Failure culture requires accepting something that 
does not go as planned and to “believe in it anyway” 
where “we will lead it to success against all the odds, 
even if it might take longer.“ (Innovation Manager of 
Case A, IP01). 
In order to cultivate such a mindset, resting on a 
greater startup feeling and acceptance of failure, we 
found in six cases that employees embrace digital 
skills which they do not have at the moment. These 
firms question “if we have the needed skills to devel-
op money-making business models” (IP 11). Hence, 
they are looking for “people with digital skills” 
(IP11) who entrench digital values and favor digital 
solutions. In the end, the required skill set has cer-
tainly changed (IP05), demanding new skills and an 
open mindset to digital technology. On one hand, 
firms are satisfying their need for new skills by de-
veloping and reassessing available skills internally 
(IP20), on the other hand, they are acquiring new 
skills externally from the labor market (IP04).  
A digital world requires firms to embrace digital 
skills where “we had and have capabilities in the 
firm [publisher] which are mainly no longer needed 
in this way. […] we need completely different people 
now who can work for the firm. But this shift happens 
very slowly.” (Head of Business Development of 
Case C, IP04). 
In order to support the organizational structure of 
firms (e.g., the Artifacts), even the most fundamental 
values like power structure within firms [19] and 
decision-making mechanisms do change. Finally, the 
role of IT is empowered allowing digital demands to 
be reflected in the values, too. In eight cases, we ob-
served firms that support power equality amongst 
employees and across the hierarchy. Power and the 
responsibilities are distributed in those firms across 
business units to improve the alignment of digital 
innovation processes. We learned that with agile de-
velopment frameworks like Scrum, responsibilities of 
each employee are clearer and the new role system is 
favored by the employees (IP05). Generally, the 
power is more distributed in the firm and around the 
individual employees. Hence, power has moved to-
wards the middle and lower management and is less 
concentrated at the top, which allows a faster reaction 
to change in the business environment. Furthermore, 
power is also given to the lowest hierarchy level as 
“each employee can make improvements” (IP04) and 
thereby contribute. 
Equal power might raise questions at the begin-
ning of “Who is actually responsible for the product? 
Is it the publisher? Is it the development department? 
Or is it the editorial team?”, but allows everybody to 
contribute in a structured way. “Now in the agile 
world, the roles are still clearly assigned. […] Prod-
uct owners and the editorial team are developing 
stories together. […] And developers implement 
them.“ (Deputy General Manager of Case C, IP05). 
Further, the next value in the digital age, visible 
in seven out of eleven cases, is active practicing of 
mutual decision-making. Where it was easy in the 
past to separate decision-making with respect to the 
department, decisions are now made jointly and his-
torical separations are given up (IP05). Furthermore, 
we see decisions being made at lower levels and are, 
hence, more distributed in the firm. Decisions are 
then aggregated in order to match the overall firm’s 
objectives.  
Mutual decisions eliminate previously established 
boundaries between business and IT as now “it is 
much more technological. And we recognize that it is 
not something where we can keep up the separation. 
[…] We have to overcome the past and we must ac-
tually collaborate much more intensively” (IT and 
Deputy General Manager of Case C, IP05). 
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 We observed changes in the perception of IT in 
all cases. The role of the IT unit does fundamentally 
change where firms are undergoing changes in the 
organization due to digitalization. Specifically, in 
seven cases, the new role of IT is best described as: 
IT as a business creator. IT is cutting loose from 
traditional ties to a service provider role (focused on 
receiving orders from business) and moves into a 
more independent role where it actively designs es-
sential features of new products during the innovation 
process. As a result, “IT is now playing a very crucial 
role” (IP02). This goes as far as IT now being inte-
grated with business units in decision-making around 
new products. More competencies are delegated to IT 
and IT is developing to a respected and equal partner 
for the development of new online service or digitally 
enhanced products. Contrary to the traditional view 
where IT was seen as an order taker, the new role of 
IT is the driver of digital initiatives in the firm (IP18) 
and digital enabler for new products (IP05).  
In a digital world, IT is now seen as a business 
creator and is “no longer responsible for the mainte-
nance of the server, nor are we the person who is 
called if a projector is not working“ (IT and Deputy 
General Manager of Case C, IP05).  
 
4.3. Underlying Assumptions  
 
In this section, we present the Underlying As-
sumptions that deal with the phenomena that remain 
unexplained when experts are asked about character-
istics of organizational culture [26]. Therefore, we 
critically reflected and triangulated the interviews 
with the OC literature to arrive at the Underlying 
Assumptions. We abstracted the central issues of 
digitalizing firms from the facets of the Artifacts as 
well as Espoused Beliefs and Values (hence, they are 
presented along with direct quotes from the interview 
in italic). We used the input given in the interviews to 
interpret what the analyzed firms have in common 
and present our four central results as Underlying 
Assumptions in accordance with Schein [26]:  
The first underlying assumption identified in our 
research is: We are lacking skills needed for digitali-
zation, and, even worse, often digital talents favor hip 
competitors (i.e., ‘Perceived Need for Digital 
Skills’). In all cases, we recognized difficulties in 
attracting the sparse but highly qualified talents with 
the needed digital or IT background. Digitalizing 
firms have to recognize that their current OC does not 
meet the requirements of the employees these firms 
are currently targeting. Hence, firms are engaging in 
the war for talent and try to be attractive for digital 
talents. Only with the right human resources, they 
assume to be prepared for the future. What we ob-
served is that firms adopt fairly uncommon values to 
create atmospheres digital talents feel comfortable in. 
As such firms try to attract young technology-affine 
employees by reaching for more equally distributed 
power to trigger employees own decision-making or 
by providing conveniences, usually only found in 
startups like pool tables, fridges with fruits, scooters, 
and coffee shops. Further, they adopt a failure cul-
ture, i.e. allowing to test risky ideas without being 
sanctioned, to motivate employees to try out new 
things and come up with novel solutions. Moreover, 
OC is redefined by new forms of collaboration with 
partners to source the required skills from the out-
side, eventually aiming at their transition.  
The second Underlying Assumption that evolves 
from our interviews is: We feel a pressure from de-
manding customers who request the affordances of 
smart, connected products (i.e., ‘Increasingly De-
manding Digital Customers’). Many firms perceive 
that they need to exploit the new affordances of 
smart, connected products, i.e. continuous develop-
ment, continuous monitoring, post-hoc adaptation, 
product-as-a-service, cross-product integration [cf. 
22] in order to stand the test of digitalization. These 
affordances allow for novel approaches to engage 
with customers in digitalized ways for their conven-
ience. This is combined with the fear that firms that 
do not adopt a digital culture, e.g., adopting the iden-
tified Artifacts and Values, may lose customers to 
competitors that provide these convenient affordanc-
es. Thus, most of our interview partners mingle prod-
uct development employees with IT employees in 
cross-functional teams to combine the skills and ca-
pabilities to integrate ‘digital materiality’ into non-
digital products and the know-how to handle digital-
ized products. Further, traditional firms radically flat-
ten their hierarchies to allow mutual decision-making 
for faster reaction and joint decisions on new prod-
ucts. The failure culture encourages employees to 
integrate their ideas to enable faster innovations.  
The third Underlying Assumption is: We need 
improved agility to react faster to changes and to 
protect ourselves from faster competitors (i.e., ‘Ne-
cessity for Increased Agility’). Due to the fact that 
digital transformations are unpredictable [32] and 
technological uncertainty in general [9], firms face 
uncertainties from ‘everything’ being digitalized 
(e.g., shoes, fridges, cars, bottles of wines, etc.). This 
trend incurs the need for more agility in order to react 
quickly to threatening competitors and to defend a 
firm by transforming the firm. Eventually, improved 
agility is achieved through internal and external col-
laboration, but also through equal power distribution 
which strongly empowers the employees by integrat-
ing their ideas into new innovations. Hence, firms 
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 establish cross-functional teams to collate knowledge 
sets from different disciplines, and to spur numerous 
and more creative ideas. This is complemented by 
introducing a startup mentality which is more open 
and inclusive to new ideas. Again, in order to speed 
up decision-making processes when developing new 
solutions firms delegate decisions down to lower-
level employees. Furthermore, collaboration with 
customers is being established to receive faster feed-
back to, once again, further enhance digital products. 
Fourth, the following basic assumption emerged 
from our research: We need to understand IT and its 
employees as an integral part of the product we sell 
(i.e., ‘Buoyant Integration of IT into Innovating’). 
From our case studies, we learned that the business 
side of firms is frequently focusing strongly on tradi-
tional sales procedures while neglecting the digital 
transformation. Without eradicating barriers created 
through the legacy and stopping power games by 
resistant managers, firms will find it hard to recog-
nize IT as an essential part of digital innovations. We 
learned that firms try to realize their digitalization by 
reducing retarding forces (identifying digital skills, 
equalizing power distribution), and increasing accel-
erating forces (getting support from everybody from 
top management to lower level like in a startup and 
finding new organizational structures). Firms address 
these ‘crusts’ by adopting a failure culture that pro-
motes mistakes because one can learn from them. 
Although some managers still perceive IT as a ser-
vice unit that focuses on helpdesk tasks, we observed 
the need to establish a ‘Digital IT’ [15] or IT as a 
business creator which has strong implications for 
the role of IT. In order to integrate digital capabilities 
into previously non-digital products, firms need to 
place people with IT and business background in 
cross-functional teams on projects and assure an at-
mosphere of mutual power, trust, and respect to allow 
for digitalizing firms to develop products that inte-
grate both digital and physical materiality. In Figure 
1, we provide an overview of how Artifacts, Es-
poused Beliefs and Values, and Underlying Assump-
tions appear in the ‘Digital Organizational Culture’. 
We arrived at this depiction by relating the state-
ments that were identified as Artifacts or Values and 
Beliefs to the topic that was convened on in the inter-
view guideline. Hence, the Underlying Assumptions 
were the underlying reasons for the particular Artifact 
or Values and Belief to be mentioned (which we in-
dicate through the arrows in the overview model): 
 
Figure 1. Digital organizational culture 
 
 
5. Implications and Limitations 
 
To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to 
identify the facets of OC in digitalizing firms. 
Through extracting initiatives and managerial actions 
from 27 interviews in eleven digitalizing firms, we 
have learned what firms undertake on the Artifacts 
level (i.e., cross-functional teams, physical and virtu-
al collaboration, dual structures, collaboration with 
startups, platform business with partners and compet-
itors, and customer integration; cf. Section 4.1) and 
on the level of Espoused Beliefs and Values (i.e., 
startup mentality, failure culture, embracing digital 
skills, power equality, mutual decision-making, and 
IT as a business creator; cf. Section 4.2) to digitalize 
their firms. Further, a process of profound interpreta-
tion and abstraction allowed us to derive four Under-
lying Assumptions (i.e., perceived need for digital 
skills, increasingly demanding digital customers, the 
necessity for increased agility, and buoyant integra-
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 tion of IT into innovating; cf. Section 4.3) from an 
extensive set of empirical data. We conclude that 
these assumptions form the intrinsic motivations for 
firms to digitalize and present forces in digitalizing 
firms. According to Schein [26] these forces are 
powerful because they operate under limited aware-
ness and can explain the new OC currently developed 
in digitalizing firms. 
We have also captured the relation of business 
and IT units in digitalizing firms. When previously 
non-digital products (consisting only of physical ma-
teriality) are enriched with digital materiality [35], 
firms need to reconsider how they organize for inno-
vating [36]. Consequently, we found that previously 
non-digital development teams (consisting only of 
conventional business functions) are enriched with 
digital skills (IT professionals). Starting from the 
Artifacts level, several initiatives and managerial 
actions (e.g., cross-functional teams, physical and 
virtual collaboration, and dual structures) indicate 
that managers increasingly integrate IT professionals 
into the development of digital innovations. These IT 
professionals come either from within the firm or 
through the integration of startups or hiring profes-
sionals (some firms build digital units or appoint new 
chief digital officers for this integration). This is 
complemented by adopting a set of Espoused Values 
and Beliefs (e.g., startup mentality, failure culture) 
that further pronounces the practices from software 
development (i.e., digital skills) in previously non-
digital development teams. Following, the boundary 
between business and IT functions dissolves in digi-
talizing firms because the relation between employ-
ees of IT and business is being internalized in cross-
functional teams and no longer delineated by tradi-
tional unit boundaries. This perspective deviates from 
classical perspectives [16, 17] as the relationships 
between organizational units are replaced by relations 
between individuals with different capabilities within 
the cross-functional team. Thus, boundaries among 
organizational units disappear.  
From these contributions, we derive the following 
implications for practice: First, firms may follow the 
examples collated from our cases and place employ-
ees from IT and business functions in one team for 
developing digital innovations. The rationale is bring-
ing knowledge resources (from the physical and digi-
tal materiality perspective) closer together and re-
moving internal boundaries between them. Second, 
practitioners can use our results to evaluate which 
Artifacts, as well as Espoused Values and Beliefs, are 
beneficial to them, and deploy them when they are 
digitalizing and start the development of digital inno-
vations. Third, digitalizing firms are facing greater 
uncertainty due to technological changes, knowledge 
intense tasks, and high-performance expectations. 
Therefore, the hierarchy is now often only exception-
ally employed since the number of exceptions in-
creases until hierarchy becomes overloaded [10]. 
Hence, firms shift their forms of coordination to-
wards mutual adjustment [19] because they are better 
suited for knowledge workers who possess fungible 
knowledge that is not limited to a specific task but 
applicable to a wide range of activities [22]. 
Besides the implications, there are also some limi-
tations of our work. First, the results may appear to 
be ‘cherry-picked’ as we could not use a chronologi-
cal structure nor an order based on popularity due to 
the heterogeneity of our cases and interviewees. Yet, 
we account for that by taking a theoretical lens [27], 
following this lens’ aspects, and validating the coding 
between the researchers. Second, Schein [26] intro-
duces a multitude of aspects for each level which are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive; thus, we adopted 
the concepts as they matched best. Third, the authors 
have conducted interviews with managers in elev-
en companies which will prevent a deep understand-
ing of the situation in each company. Organizational 
culture is not an easy concept to understand and two 
or three interviews for each company may not be 
enough. We avert this aspect by triangulating compa-
ny reports, and additional data that we retrieved from 
the firms under scrutiny. 
Last, we investigated firms from different but not 
all industries, which may raise concerns due to gen-
eralizability. Although, we acknowledge this ongoing 
debate, we are in accordance with Schwarz et al. [28] 
who claim that few cases have the benefit of provid-
ing more thoroughness in the analysis process. 
On the other hand, while including firms from 
different industries might blend and even obfuscate 
many contextual factors such as regulation intensity 
and particular industry or professional cultures, our 
aim is to take a more cross-sectional perspective and 
identify constituents of a digital organizational cul-
ture. Based on our results we see promising avenues 
for future research in looking deeper into these con-
stituents and how their interplay with particularities 
of various industries shape the respective digitaliza-
tion landscapes.  
Hence, research and practice should further inves-
tigate the ‘digital organizational culture’ so that firms 
are able to consciously shape it. Then, organizational 
actors can restructure Artifacts and Espoused Beliefs 
and Values for combining physical and digital com-
ponents as well as capabilities to develop digital in-
novations. Consequently, understanding the manifes-
tation of a ‘digital organizational culture’ is necessary 
for digitalizing the firm in a comprehensive way.  
 
Page 5134
 6. References  
  
[1] Antoncic, B., and R.D. Hisrich, “Clarifying the 
Intrapreneurship Concept”, Journal of Small Business and 
Enterprise Development 10(1), 2003, pp. 7–24. 
[2] Barney, J.B., “Organizational Culture: Can It Be a 
Source of Sustained Competitive Advantage?”, The 
Academy of Management Review 11(3), 1986, pp. 656–665. 
[3] Boyles, J.L., “The Isolation of Innovation”, Digital 
Journalism 4(2), 2016, pp. 229–246. 
[4] Boynton, A.C., and R.W. Zmud, “Information 
Technology Planning in the 1990’s: Directions for Practice 
and Research”, MIS Quarterly 11(1), 1987, pp. 59–71. 
[5] Bughin, J., M. Chui, and J. Manyika, “An Executive’s 
Guide to the Internet of Things”, McKinsey Quarterly 9(2), 
2015, pp. 89–105. 
[6] Cameron, K. s., and R.E. Quinn, Diagnosing and 
Changing Organizational Culture, Jossey-Bass, San 
Francisco, 2006. 
[7] Dasgupta, S., D. Agarwal, A. Ioannidis, and S. 
Gopalakrishnan, “Determinants of Information Technology 
Adoption: An Extension of Existing Models to Firms in a 
Developing Country”, Journal of Global Information 
Management 7(3), 1999, pp. 30–40. 
[8] Eisenhardt, K.M., “Building Theories from Case Study 
Research”, Academy of Management Review 14(4), 1989, 
pp. 532–550. 
[9] Fleming, L., “Recombinant Uncertainty in 
Technological Search”, Management Science 47(1), 2001, 
pp. 117–132. 
[10] Galbraith, J.R., “Organization Design: An Information 
Processing View”, Interfaces 4(3), 1974, pp. 28–36. 
[11] Grau, C., and J. Moormann, “Investigating the 
Relationship between Process Management and 
Organizational Culture: Literature Review and Research 
Agenda”, Management and Organizational Studies 1(2), 
2014, pp. 2330–5495. 
[12] Hallikainen, H., B. Paesbrugghe, T. Laukkanen, D. 
Rangarajan, and M. Gabrielsson, “How Individual 
Technology Propensities and Organizational Culture 
Influence B2B Customer’s Behavioral Intention to Use 
Digital Services at Work?”, Proceedings of the 50th 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 
(2017), 4577–4585. 
[13] Harper, G.R., and D.R. Utley, “Organizational Culture 
and Successful Information Technology Implementation”, 
Engineering Management Journal 13(2), 2001, pp. 11–15. 
[14] Harrington, S.J., and T. Guimaraes, “Corporate 
Culture, Absorptive Capacity and IT Success”, Information 
and Organization 15(1), 2005, pp. 39–63. 
[15] Horlach, B., P. Drews, and I. Schirmer, “Bimodal IT: 
Business-IT Alignment in the Age of Digital 
Transformation”, Proceedings of the Multikonferenz 
Wirtschaftsinformatik, Ilmenau, (2016), 1417–1428. 
[16] Karim, S., “Modularity in Organizational Structure: 
The Reconfiguration of Internally Developed and Acquired 
Business Units”, Strategic Management Journal 27(9), 
2006, pp. 799–823. 
[17] Karim, S., and A. Kaul, “Structural Recombination 
and Innovation: Unlocking Intraorganizational Knowledge 
Synergy through Structural Change”, Organizational 
Science 26(2), 2015, pp. 439–455. 
[18] Miles, M., and M. Huberman, Qualitative Data 
Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook, Sage Publishing, 
Thousand Oaks, 1994. 
[19] Mintzberg, H., The Structuring of Organizations, 
Prentice-Hill, Englewood Cliffs, 1979. 
[20] Nambisan, S., K. Lyytinen, A. Majchrzak, and M. 
Song, “Digital Innovation Management: Reinventing 
Innovation Management Research in a Digital Wolrd”, MIS 
Quarterly 41(1), 2017, pp. 223–238. 
[21] Porter, M.E., and J.E. Heppelmann, “How Smart, 
Connected Products Are Transforming Companies”, 
Harvard Business Review 92(11), 2015, pp. 96–114. 
[22] Powell, W., “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network 
Forms of Organization”, Research in Organizational 
Behavior 12(2), 1990, pp. 295–336. 
[23] Punnett, B.J., and D.A. Ricks, International Business, 
PWS-Kent., Boston, 1990. 
[24] Ravasi, D.. c, and M.. d Schultz, “Responding to 
Organizational Identity Threats: Exploring the Role of 
Organizational Culture”, Academy of Management Journal 
49(3), 2006, pp. 433–458. 
[25] Scheibe, K.P., and M. Gupta, “The Effect of 
Socializing via Computer-mediated Communication on the 
Relationship between Organizational Culture and 
Organizational Creativity”, Communications of the 
Association for Information Systems 40(13), 2017, pp. 294–
314. 
[26] Schein, E.H., Organizational Culture and Leadership: 
A Dynamic View, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1985. 
[27] Schein, E.H., Organizational Culture and Leadership, 
Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2010. 
[28] Schwarz, A., W.W. Chin, R. Hirschheim, and C. 
Schwarz, “Toward a Process-based View of Information 
Technology Acceptance”, Journal of Information 
Technology 29(1), 2014, pp. 73–96. 
[29] Serrano, C.I., “Exploring the Cultural Impacts of 
Electronic Work Environments in Organizations”, 
Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Information Systems, Montreal, (2007). 
[30] Sheng, Y.P., M. Pearson, and L. Crosby, 
“Organizational Culture and Employees’ Computer Self-
Efficacy”, Information Resources Management Journal 
16(3), 2003, pp. 42–58. 
[31] Tilson, D., K. Lyytinen, and C. Sørensen, “Digital 
Infrastructures: The Missing IS Research Agenda”, 
Information Systems Research 21(4), 2010, pp. 748–759. 
[32] Westerman, G., D. Bonnet, and A.P. McAfee, Leading 
Digital, Harvard Business Review Press, Boston, MA, 
2014. 
[33] Yin, R.K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 
Sage Publications, New York, 2009. 
[34] Yoo, Y., R.J. Boland, K. Lyytinen, A. Majchrzak, and 
A. Majchrzak, “Organizing for Innovation in the Digitized 
World”, Organization Science 23(5), 2012, pp. 1398–1408. 
[35] Yoo, Y., O. Henfridsson, and K. Lyytinen, “The New 
Organizing Logic of Digital Innovation: An Agenda for 
Information Systems Research”, Information Systems 
Research 21(4), 2010, pp. 724–735. 
[36] Zammuto, R.F., T.L. Griffith,  a. Majchrzak, D.J. 
Dougherty, and S. Faraj, “Information Technology and the 
Changing Fabric of Organization”, Organization Science 
18(5), 2007, pp. 749–762. 
 
Page 5135
